In the case of controversial interventions there is a need for clinical guidelines to be founded on 'expert opinion' and an evidence base, in order to minimise individual clinicians making subjective decisions influenced by bias or cultural norms. This paper considers international clinical guidelines that through recommendation effectively prohibit the provision of genital-alignment surgery for competent adolescents with gender dysphoria. I argue that although the rationale for this particular guideline is based on serious concerns, these need to be better understood to allow reconsideration of this unilateral prohibitive recommendation. I do not propose that genital-alignment surgery should be prima-facia provided for any adolescent with gender dysphoria. Instead I argue that by developing our understanding of the current concerns, we can allow guidelines to incorporate a margin of clinical discretion, to allow clinicians to provide genital-alignment surgery to some adolescents, where clinically appropriate. In facilitating this we can move towards establishing a solid evidence-base. The basis of this position is that clinical guidelines and medical practice should treat these young people with the same standards of evidence-based care as others who have less controversial conditions. Whilst this paper uses English law and UK professional regulation for context, many of the ethical, legal and professional issues highlighted are applicable to other jurisdictions.
Introduction
The use of clinical guidelines, based on 'expert opinion' and evidence, is widely regarded as supporting clinicians in the provision of care in accordance with best practice. 1 It can be inferred that their application in individual cases, to some extent, minimises the risk of clinical decision-making being influenced by bias, cultural norms or subjective reasoning. In the case of controversial medical practices, it is important to consider the contentions stemming from these influences in the development and application of the relevant guidelines. The clinical care of transgender minors with gender dysphoria is one such controversial area of medical practice. Not only are there clinical concerns but wider professional, legal and societal concerns, particularly for irreversible interventions such as surgery. 2 Current clinical guidelines for genital-alignment surgery (GAS) 3 are unanimous in the recommendation that GAS be delayed until at least the age of majority, based on a presumptive 'high' risk for this surgery. 4 Yet despite these clinical guidelines being recommendations, when we consider the authoritative influence of clinical guidelines in medical practice, it might be suggested that the result is either a de-facto prohibition of GAS in those below the age of majority; or that the provision of such surgery becomes entirely secretive. Of concern, for both transgender adolescents seeking GAS and treating medical clinicians, is that a robust evidence base does not underpin this specific recommendation, but it is instead based on serious ethical and clinical concerns. In this paper I acknowledge these serious concerns but seek to challenge our understanding of them. In doing so I contest the position that GAS should be presumptively and unilaterally considered as 'high risk' and therefore not recommended for those under the age of 18.
Although the ethical issues for GAS in adolescents have previously been highlighted within the literature, 5 this paper seeks to go further and rethink our understanding of the specific clinical and ethical concerns underpinning the current recommendation within clinical guidelines. I will highlight that the current cautionary recommendations contradict aspects of these clinical guidelines, which acknowledge that competent adolescents can provide informed consent to other gender aligning interventions for gender dysphoria, which may well be irreversible. Furthermore, the paper will consider whether the current recommendation appears to disregard the professional, ethical and legal position that competent adolescents can provide informed consent for surgical interventions, using UK professional medical regulation and English law to demonstrate this. Whilst this paper uses English law and UK professional regulation for context, many of the ethical, legal and professional issues highlighted are applicable to other jurisdictions.
I will ultimately argue that the provision of GAS for competent adolescents should exist within a margin of discretion for clinicians involved in caring for this vulnerable population. Importantly, by tempering the current guidelines to allow margins of discretion we would better enable clinicians to openly consider and even perform such surgery, where it is considered to be in a patient's best interests and lawful within the jurisdiction. In the absence of a solid evidence base this position would allow clinicians to present more transparent adolescent GAS data, in order to better inform the development of future evidence-based clinical guidelines.
Current clinical guidelines
In order to challenge the presumptive guidelines that GAS provision for adolescents is 'high risk' we must in the first instance understand the current position of clinical and professional practice for children and adolescents. Gender dysphoria is defined in the US Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) as 'a strong desire to be of the other gender or an insistence that he or she is the other gender'. 6 To support diagnosis the DSM-V highlights that children with gender dysphoria should have 'clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other areas of functioning'. 7 The World Health Organization has recently reconceptualised the previous classifications of Transsexualism and Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood. These are now classified as Gender Incongruence of Childhood or Adolescence and Adulthood in the recently released (yet to be ratified at the time of this publication) version 11 of the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ICD). 8 Of significance when considering the issue of surgery is that in the ICD-11 Gender Incongruence of Adolescence and Adulthood is a singular classification category.
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Clinical guidelines for the management of children with a diagnosis of gender dysphoria are staged and in the first instance focus primarily on psychological support prior to any consideration of physical intervention. 10 Immediate first-stage physical intervention for gender dysphoria in children is initially limited to socalled puberty suppression therapy, usually using gonadotropin-releasing hormone, to temporarily suspend secondary anatomical and physiological sex characteristic development. 11 Older adolescents can then consider the second stage of physical intervention through administration of cross-sex hormone therapy at around the age of 16. 12 Cross-sex hormone therapy provides hormones that correspond to the experienced gender, in order to feminise or masculinise the body. 13 The decision to begin this stage of partially irreversible treatment is taken through a shared decision-making approach, involving clinicians, the patient and where possible their family, which must include consideration of long-term irreversible effects on fertility.
14 The most recent guidelines from the Endocrine Society acknowledge that the needs of individual adolescents can permit clinicians to depart from the suggested age restriction for the provision of cross-sex hormone therapy, when it is considered to be in the best interests of an adolescent. 15 In contrast for GAS the Endocrine Society Guidelines state 'We suggest that clinicians delay gender-affirming genital surgery involving gonadectomy and/or hysterectomy until the patient is at least 18 years old or legal age of majority in his or her country'. 16 The World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) state that chest surgery may be considered prior to the age of majority, based on the needs of the individual patient, providing the adolescent has received 12 months of cross-sex hormone therapy. 17 There is then a distinction within these clinical guidelines between other irreversible and partially irreversible interventions and GAS, in that they can be considered on the individual needs of a patient, without absolute deference to a specific age.
Professional consequences
Whilst clinical guidelines are often recognised as best practice, doctors must still consider the provision of care in respect of their professional regulatory standards. In the United Kingdom for example, professional misconduct investigations and hearings involving doctors who have privately prescribed cross-sex hormone therapy to adolescents have highlighted the professional and public consequences of care that has not adhered to clinical guidelines, further reflected in the negative media coverage. 18 These doctors argued that their actions were clinically appropriate and in the best interests of their patients, which by itself is a valid reason to depart from clinical guidelines. 19 It is of note that in these cases complaints did not come from patients in relation to harm caused or regret following the treatments received, and neither did the complaints come from families, instead these complaints were made by fellow doctors. Perhaps a contributory factor in this, as Barrett argues, is that doctors do not universally regard gender dysphoria as being a legitimate medical diagnosis and as a consequence there is an increased level of scrutiny for those who provide partial or entirely irreversible treatment. 20 If then the authority of these clinical guidelines is further strengthened by the fact that any provision of GAS to adolescents is unlikely to be well supported by doctors themselves, we need to understand the ethical and clinical concerns that GAS is not clinically appropriate for these young people. These arguments will be addressed individually and will reflect the profile of them within the literature.
Potential regret
A significant reason for delaying surgery are concerns that the adolescent may later in their life regret the decision to have undergone irreversible genital surgery. 21 When considering the developing emotional and intellectual maturity of an adolescent, this concern is given greater weighting on the basis of clinicians being less certain of the diagnosis of gender dysphoria persisting beyond adolescence. 22 These concerns can be considered from two aspects. First, that there is a greater uncertainty of diagnosis where the person is not yet an adult and therefore an increased risk of regret directly as a result of not delaying GAS. Second, that the irreversible nature of GAS means that a minor cannot attain the insight to understand the potential for regret, in the contexts of surgery not actually being required or in relation to the side effects of surgery.
In response to the first aspect of regret concerns, we should consider whether we could ever be certain that regret is an entirely avoidable outcome in any irreversible intervention. Importantly, whether such regret is somehow or in some way unique to GAS and can be reduced or avoided with delay is not apparent. In fact we could argue that any surgical modification carries with it the risk of regret, what is important is to acknowledge that it is an acceptable choice for a competent individual to assume that risk. The possibility of regret therefore cannot be a valid reason to delay treatment because it has not been demonstrated that delaying the treatment reduces the likelihood of regret. Furthermore, it is important to understand that persistent discomfort associated with gender dysphoria in adolescence can lead to associated psychopathology, which includes depression, self-harm and suicide. 23 I do not suggest that delaying surgery increases the risk of suicide, but if a person's distress is so intrinsically related to their genital discomfort then perhaps one justification for earlier GAS may be to alleviate these psychopathologies.
Potential regret is of course understandable when considering irreversible interventions of any kind. However, one crucial concern specific to gender dysphoria is the possibility of the gender dysphoria desisting as the adolescent matures. Desistance of gender dysphoria is well recognised in younger children; for example, Steensma et al. 24 found that the desistence percentage of young children referred to gender identity clinics is 84% by the time that they reach adolescence. At first glance this statistic may appear to be a compelling argument for surgery being delayed until a person has achieved the age of majority, but another interpretation is that adolescence is a significant milestone for children with gender dysphoria. Steensma et al. 25 identified the period between ages 10 and 13 to be the most significant when determining persistence of gender dysphoria. Olson 26 highlights that the increasing emotional and intellectual maturity of adolescents with gender dysphoria further supports persistence and thus greater certainty of diagnosis when considering gender affirming intervention.
In response to the second aspect of regret concerns, Giordano argues that negating the risk of regret is an impossible insight because a definitive satisfactory outcome for any surgery itself can never be guaranteed or anticipated. 27 For example, Sheehan et al. 28 found that even in reconstructive surgery as a result of breast cancer, with the aim of restoring previously experienced breast tissue, regret featured in higher than previously anticipated numbers as a result of psychological distress associated with surgery. Yet conversely, for regret after GAS, Wiepjes et al. 29 recently published data on the largest cohort study of transgender people who received gender-affirming treatment and found that of those who underwent GAS only 0.6% of trans women and 0.3% of trans men identified as experiencing some form of regret. In considering the example of unanticipated regret in reconstructive surgery and the small percentage of regret following GAS we should acknowledge that regret may occur following GAS for competent adolescents despite being unanticipated. Yet there is no evidence to suggest that unanticipated regret would not occur in the same way for adolescents as it would in adults.
A further aspect of the regret argument relates to side effects of GAS, most notably the impact upon fertility, particularly when GAS will follow cross-sex hormone therapy. 30 The WPATH and the Endocrine Society recommend that adolescents consider fertility as part of decision-making, with potential consideration of preservation of sperm or ovum for future assisted reproduction if desired. 31 Chen et al. 32 found that fertility preservation procedures were low in adolescents and this was attributed to cost of procedures, invasiveness and the impact upon delaying further treatment. In exploring the low rate of fertility preservation, Nahata et al. 33 found that despite reported assumptions that the desire to reproduce was the same in the transgender population, this was not reflected in their findings. Indeed, many transgender adolescents reported never wanting to have children, but even so the importance of long-term data was highlighted as imperative. 34 Furthermore, Nahata et al.
35 discuss a distinct difference between the anger faced by adolescents having undergone cancer treatment without fertility preservation, in that fertility and gender identity have a different relationship with fertility choices than that of a disease. Whilst infertility could contribute to feelings of regret, and the future ability to become a biological parent is an important consideration, there is no evidence to compellingly demonstrate that this is significant for those who have undergone GAS early in adulthood. Importantly, there is no evidence to suggest that delayed GAS is a contributory benefit in the avoidance of any such regret.
Can a minor reject a gender?
There is a further concern distinct from regret, which is that of insight and the subsequent ability, or otherwise, of an adolescent to even reject an anticipated or expected adult gender identity and the presumptive corresponding genitalia. 36 Experience as an adult within the rejected gender identity might be argued as being the only way in which both the transgender patient and their clinicians can be reassured with any degree of certainty that irreversible surgery is indicated. 37 However, any expectation that a transgender person must attain such insight through experience in order to access GAS is questionable. To start with, there is a clear ethical and legal problem in only allowing a person to make a decision to reject something if they have had entire first-hand experience of it. In English law this has been addressed by establishing that a person has the right to make a decision without having experienced the alternative treatments or courses of action that they are rejecting, providing that there is evidence that they have considered them. 38 Requiring decision-making to have a compulsory element of subjective experience would be contrary to the fundamental ethical principle of autonomy and subsequent accepted components of informed consent. If we take the requirement to have experienced something entirely in order to reject it to its full conclusion then only a minority would be able to reject any given thing. For example, we do not require women to have experienced vaginal childbirth to reject it and consider a surgical alternative. 39 Obstetric professionals would discuss the concerns and provide information to ensure that a woman was making an informed decision, including potential surgical complications, but there would be no legal or ethical requirement to demonstrate insight through first-hand experience of vaginal delivery. Even in the case of a pregnant adolescent, a comprehensive multi-disciplinary approach to care would be provided to support decision-making and antenatal care, with consideration of the potential experiences involved. The same can be said for GAS whereby robust assessment, which includes evidence of consideration of the impact of surgery on gender identity, supports the decision-making process.
When we consider current management using puberty suppression therapy and cross-sex hormone treatment, the lived natal expected gender experience of an 18-year-old who has undergone this treatment is not extended and therefore should not be considered any different or as being more valuable to clinical assessment than a 15-year-old who has undergone the same. In support, de Vries et al. 40 found that rather than a lived period of gender dissatisfaction within that gender role being important to rejecting a gender, it is the multi-disciplinary support that the adolescent with gender dysphoria receives to establish their gender identity that it is important. Greater experience of the rejected gender and genitalia should only be argued as being rationalised on the basis that it would satisfy clinicians, rather than recognising that a competent adolescent could demonstrate this through psychological assessment and evaluation of the gender dysphoria.
Any requirement to have prolonged experience in the rejected gender as an adult or adolescent is also by itself morally questionable. In effect this would mean that a person would be forced to experience and demonstrate continued discomfort, furthermore that this extended period of discomfort would be as a direct result of clinical management. It is important to acknowledge that for a diagnosis of gender dysphoria an adolescent would already have experienced significant discomfort in order to access any treatment. There is then potentially a professional and ethical concern, in that a requirement to prolong further genital discomfort could contravene the principal of nonmaleficence. In order to adhere to a recommendation a doctor would knowingly not consider GAS as a justifiable potential treatment option, even when by doing so there is continued and potentially increased distress. Whilst we should accept that surgery itself is harmful, as in all surgical provision the intended benefits must be balanced against potential harm and risk. In cases where there is doubt as to whether an adolescent is actually demonstrating clear rejection of a gender and their natal genitalia, despite presenting with distress, such harm may be justified. Where this is not the case and the adolescent demonstrates clear rejection of a gender with associated genital distress, then for a doctor to knowingly disregard this when a potential treatment option exists could be considered as maleficent.
Are there surgical reasons for restriction?
The distress associated with gender dysphoria and potential associated psychopathology could be argued as sufficient to make the provision of GAS permissible for adolescents, but we must consider whether there are surgical reasons that make GAS inappropriate for adolescents. Within the literature the predominant focus for GAS considerations in adolescents and young adults relates to trans females, which reflects the increased provision of vaginoplasty, in comaparison to trans male GAS, for example phalloplasty. In the case of Male to Female (MtF) GAS there is a need for adequate urogenital development to provide sufficient soft and functional vaginal tissue. 41 The importance of having sufficient tissue when performing inversion vaginoplasty surgery, the construction of a vagina using techniques that invert the penis or scrotum, is to reduce the need for additional procedures or alternative procedures to inversion surgery. This involves the use of intestinal grafts in the absence of sufficient tissue, to improve patient satisfaction with genital morphology. 42 Although increased surgical complexity and patient dissatisfaction are valid concerns, there are a number of problems with this argument.
For MtF GAS we must understand the impact of puberty suppression upon vaginoplasty surgery even if delayed until adulthood. The suspension of secondary sex characteristic development, which will include the underdevelopment of penile and scrotal tissue, will reduce available tissue. Indeed, surgeons who have performed inversion procedures on MtF adolescents and older adults who had received puberty suppression therapy in adolescence have expressed concerns regarding reduced tissue availability and the affect upon surgical vaginal morphology. 43 In fact to avoid this, the only option for adolescents would be to interrupt the suspension of secondary sex characteristic development for the time that is necessary to provide sufficient penile tissue growth for the creation of a vagina. As highlighted earlier, when we consider the discomfort and distress this may cause, there is a strong ethical argument against doing so. Furthermore, when we acknowledge that the underdevelopment of penile and scrotal tissue will be the same for both the adolescent and the adult patient who have undergone puberty suppression therapy, there is a significant issue with applying the reduced tissue argument as a reason to delay MtF GAS. In considering the impact of reduced tissue following puberty suppression on MtF GAS and the increased surgical complexities associated, it is therefore important to explore the impact of this in relation to patient satisfaction.
Recently de Vries et al. 44 found that patient genital dissatisfaction, on the basis of aesthetic and functional results, was not a significant issue in young adults who had undergone GAS and had undergone puberty suppression therapy. Importantly, patients were satisfied more so on the basis of having undergone GAS and the positive impact surgery had on their physical and mental wellbeing. 45 Earlier GAS surgery was also found by McGuire et al. 46 to improve body image in younger adults, stressing the need to obtain data from adolescents on the impact of having undergone earlier surgery. Within the limited available data, anonymous surgeons who have performed MtF GAS on adolescents have described positive outcomes, in particular in relation to psychosocial development as they progressed into higher education and transitioned to adulthood. 47 Indeed, Milrod 48 highlights that MtF adolescents with genital distress often report emotional distress in relation to not being able to have romantic or sexual experiences, separating them from their cisgender female peer group. Although the ability to engage in sexual intercourse is restricted following surgery to support wound healing and recovery, 49 for some adolescents the potential subsequent improved self-confidence to support psychosocial development may be a further justification for earlier surgery.
There is though some conflicting data on the postoperative bodily satisfaction of vaginoplasty in patients who have undergone puberty suppression. Lawrence 50 found that puberty suppression did impact on physical satisfaction with surgical results because of unsatisfactory genital morphology, in that it was incongruent with accepted vaginal morphology. What should be distinguished in this study is that the issue is of genital morphology dissatisfaction as a result of reduced tissue availability, not regret over having undergone surgery. The study relates to adults, and if nothing else further demonstrates that the issue of reduced tissue is the same for both adolescents and adults who have undergone puberty suppression therapy. A key point is that the onus is on the adolescent to consider the consequences of reduced tissue when puberty suppressant therapy is commenced. The consequences of puberty suppression therapy on MtF GAS procedures are highlighted by the WPATH, who recommend that clinicians discuss this with natal male adolescents as part of the consent process for puberty suppression therapy. 51 Therefore, the inference from the WPATH has to be that young adolescents are able to take a decision that could result in more complex surgery and even genital dissatisfaction should the MtF person decide upon GAS.
Is there a legal basis for restriction?
The English legal principle that a competent minor below the age of 16 could provide lawful consent was established in Gillick v West Norfolk Health Authority, 52 with Lord Scarman stating that the minor must have 'sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed'. 53 Gillick is of particular significance here as the court had to consider the issue of whether a minor under the age of 16 could provide lawful consent for contraception on the basis of actual or potential underage sexual intercourse occurring, which is itself subject to social and cultural scrutiny. Yet clearly the court recognised the issue of sexual health and contraception, in agreement with doctors and healthcare providers, as being something that a competent minor could decide upon as part of an individual's health and wellbeing, regardless of such scrutiny. The law in Gillick further reflects the stance of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which asserts that as a child matures into adolescence, gaining maturity and intelligence, the increased ability to make informed autonomous treatment choices must be recognised by the State. 54 Therefore, GMC standards make it clear that a doctor can obtain valid lawful consent from a minor if they demonstrate competence to make that decision following an assessment made by the doctor, without the need for consent from a parent or other person with parental responsibility and providing the doctor agrees that such treatment is in the best interests of the minor. 55 However, older adolescents are given further statutory protection under the Family Law Reform Act 1969, whereby 16-and 17-year-olds are able to consent for medical treatment in the same way as an adult, unless they are deemed to lack capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. 56 In none of this body of law is GAS specifically legally prohibited and in suggesting that adolescents with gender dysphoria are not awarded the same legal rights as other competent adolescents who can make complex healthcare decisions, we should note that the findings of the House of Commons Transgender Equality Committee Report. The report highlighted that age restrictions of interventions within the care of adolescents with gender dysphoria were potentially contrary to the legal ability of a competent adolescent to provide lawful consent. 57 Yet we must understand that there is an increased legal threshold and gradient of competence where an intervention results in irreversible outcomes. For example, the ability of a competent minor to provide lawful informed consent for the live donation of a kidney should still require doctors to obtain court approval, according to the Human Tissue Authority Code of Practice. 58 Concerns have though been raised in relation to the application and scope of the threshold of competence in minors, most aptly demonstrated in cases where seemingly competent minors refuse blood transfusion on religious grounds. In Re E 59 it was held that a 15-year-old could not refuse transfusion because he lacked sufficient insight into the prospect of dying and the impact of this upon his family. Brazier and Cave 60 importantly question whether adults can even attain such insight. Furthermore, as Cave 61 argues, 'the ambiguous definition of competence enabled judges to raise the threshold to arguably unattainable levels'. There is then an important criticism in enabling increased and legally fluid conceptual definitions of competence made using such cases. It is important to recognise that despite this criticism Re E considers death and if we were to logically apportion gradients of competency based on the most serious harm, then infertility should be less than this. For the transgender minor, as highlighted earlier, the evidenced discussions in respect of fertility and genital morphology, prior to receiving earlier stages of treatment, that will have taken place in the years prior to any consideration of GAS should be evidenced in part to assess the competence of an adolescent to make the decision to undergo GAS. This point is only speculative, as we would require English courts to consider such a decision; however, we can strongly position that there should be no legal basis to find that GAS provision in minors is unlawful. One suggestion may be that court approval could be considered for GAS in the same way as live organ donation and that this approach would support the actions of clinicians. Although given the years of assessment and considering the stages of transition decision-making, it could be argued that GAS is differentiated from the time sensitive nature of organ transplantation and the subsequent need for court approval to ensure the best wishes of the minor are paramount in this situation.
Nevertheless, the legal ability for minors to consent to treatment or indicate a preference for a treatment does not obligate a doctor to provide that treatment when it is not considered to be clinically or professionally appropriate. 62 Indeed, whilst the above argues that it would not be unlawful under English law to provide GAS, in light of the non-provision of GAS in England we should consider the practical issue of how doctors could meet their professional and legal responsibility to obtain informed consent in this instance. To do so we must look at the professional practice of those doctors outside of the UK who reported to have been able to gain informed consent from adolescents for GAS.
Obtaining informed consent for GAS?
Acknowledging that these clinical guidelines are recommendations rather than legal authority, there has been recent exploration of the consent process with a small number of anonymous U.S. surgeons who have performed GAS on adolescents, yet remained anonymous due to the fear of repercussions. 63 Milrod and Karasic 64 found that these surgeons undertook complex and thorough clinical, psychological and social assessment during the consent process, involving both the patient and their parents; Milrod and Karasic 65 further highlight that these surgeons were not preoccupied with concerns about regret because of the level of insight these adolescents demonstrated.
Surgeons who have performed GAS on adolescents identified the significance of parental involvement and support in the consent process, given the complexity of the surgery, aftercare and support required. 66 The issue of parental support is not just limited to GAS though; Simons et al. 67 found that parental support increases positive outcomes through a shared decision-making approach to all treatments within transgender adolescent care. We could therefore argue that a lack of parental support and acceptance is an additional consideration for the provision of informed consent for GAS in adolescents. An adolescent with gender dysphoria seeking GAS may in fact represent an instance in which competence alone is insufficient. Perhaps even that it is justified for clinicians to limit this surgery to only those adolescents with parental support, or support from other persons/guardians with parental responsibility.
Parental acceptance though has to be differentiated from parental support, as entire parental acceptance may never occur. 68 Parental support is an unlikely concern when an adolescent would be at the stage of considering GAS because they will already have socially and partially physically transitioned with cross-sex hormone therapy. This transition has included parental involvement throughout, which will have attempted to address any barriers to parental support and even acceptance through the expert and multi-professional approach to transgender care. 69 The involvement of parents within transition care does not guarantee acceptance, as parents may never fully accept their child's new gender identity or one parent may accept transition but the other parent does not. Whilst parental acceptance and support are key considerations for clinicians, the issue for the surgeon should be that there must be sufficient parental support for the adolescent to undergo GAS, with consideration of this in the informed consent process. If anything, it could be argued that cases where adolescents are supported by parents present an ideal situation in which to make the decision to undergo GAS and to provide the required supportive care.
Suggested guidance
So far in this paper I have argued that the ethical and clinical concerns that underpin the cautionary position of non-provision of GAS for persons under the age of 18 within current clinical guidelines are not persuasive. In other words, there is no substantive clinical or ethical justification for the unilateral recommendation to delay GAS until the age of majority. Furthermore, the lack of evidence to support non-provision presents further challenges to sustain this position. However, the provision of an earlier surgical intervention that will partly be in the interests of researchers and clinicians requires any suggested guidance to acknowledge the potential conflict of interests. To minimise this any suggested guidance must emphasise that provision of adolescent GAS must be well established as being in the individual's best interest. Furthermore, in acknowledging the variance in adolescent intellectual and emotional maturity, the position of the paper is that in the same way as the Endocrine Society allows a margin of clinical discretion for cross-sex hormone therapy, a similar margin should be provided within the guidelines for GAS in adolescence. This approach acknowledges the importance of the arguments presented in the paper whilst also being pragmatic and acknowledging the absence of clinical data.
I now suggest a framework from which we could provide GAS based on existing professional, ethical and (English) legal principles of adolescent healthcare to begin to provide GAS to competent adolescents. It is important to reiterate that any provision would not be appropriate in younger adolescents, particularly when considering the timeline of other phases of transition. Specific age though should not be the determining factor, rather the treatment and care already provided with a clearly agreed multi-professional position that GAS would be in the best interests of the individual.
1. Where provision of cross-sex hormone therapy has been decided as being in the best interests of a competent adolescent, which recent guidelines acknowledge can occur prior to the age of 16, after a minimum of 12 months clinicians should be able to discuss GAS if considered to be in the patient's best interests. 2. The adolescent must have appropriate support in recognition of the care required for pre-and postoperative care and recovery. I have argued that parental or suitable alternative and appropriate support, in the absence of the adolescent having parental support, should be required when considering GAS for adolescents. 3. The decision to undertake surgery must be based on informed consent as part of a multi-professional assessment, following successful physical, psychological and social transition supported by cross-sex hormone therapy. 4. Consideration of fertility would have to be evident in the informed nature of the decision; however, this would have also been considered throughout the two years of cross-sex hormone therapy and previous puberty suppression therapy. Furthermore, any professional refusal on grounds of fertility concerns would have to outweigh the present distress. Fertility discussions and any presented issues would have to be followed up and should be reported in the literature where significant. 5. Ultimately clinicians, and indeed the adolescents themselves, would have to accept that with any irreversible treatment there is the potential for adverse outcomes in the future stemming from the decision. Clinicians should understand that this by itself is not a unique concern to GAS and that competent adolescents have the right to assume this risk. However, this must be well considered within the decisionmaking process and evidenced thoroughly.
Conclusion
Whilst the widely accepted ethical and clinical arguments supporting a unilateral approach to nonprovision of GAS in adolescents results from serious and at first glance even logical concerns, these need to be better understood and reconsidered. By failing to address this we will continue to deny competent adolescents treatment that may well promote their wellbeing through earlier genital alignment. Hesitancy around this kind of treatment is understandable; nevertheless we need to ensure that it is the best interests of the individual patients involved that allow discretionary application to clinical recommendations, as has been demonstrated in the updated guidance on crosssex hormone therapy. In providing greater clinical discretion for provision of GAS to competent adolescents, we are able to treat these young people with the same standards of care and afford them comparable ethical and legal rights in decision-making as others who have less controversial conditions. It may transpire that in some cases the concerns underpinning the current unilateral position of non-provision are relevant but by treating these competent adolescents differently for an intervention we perpetuate uncertainty and scepticism for this already vulnerable population. By acknowledging this we ensure that the provision, or otherwise, of an important potential treatment be regulated by recommendations that focus on the needs of individual patients and in time the development of an evidence base, aligning with all other accepted clinical practice.
